We investigate the relationship between firm governance and the board's position in the social network of directors. Using a sample of 133 German firms over the period from 2003-2006, we find that well connected boards are associated with lower firm performance. In addition, firms with better connected directors pay their executives significantly more. We interpret these results as evidence for poor monitoring in firms that have important and well connected directors. In both cases, simple measures for busy directors that were used by other studies in the past fail to show any significant pattern. These findings indicate that the importance of additional board seats seems to play a bigger role than simply the number of board appointments. Therefore, our results suggest that calls for a limit of directorships are illadvised as long as a limitation does not take the quality of these obligations into account.
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I. Introduction
A growing literature on board characteristics investigates the question whether directors with multiple board appointments are too busy to perform their monitoring duties. The "busyness hypothesis" suggests that firms with busy directors are associated with weak corporate governance. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) confirm this assertion and show that firms with busy boards exhibit significantly lower market-to-book ratios than firms in which the majority of outside directors hold fewer than three board seats. In contrast to these results, Ferris et al. (2003) find no evidence of a relationship between the number of board appointments and firm performance.
In both cases, the underlying rationale of the busyness hypothesis is that directors who serve on a large number of boards can become overcommitted and might then shirk their responsibility as monitors. In this context, it is crucial to define which directors are busy in order to identify boards that are susceptible to the problem of overcommitted directors. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) argue that the results of Ferris et al. (2003) are driven by an insufficient and noisy measure of whether directors are busy. They propose a metric that is based on the percentage of outside directors who are busy rather than calculating the average number of board seats held by outside directors. Hence, results on the busyness hypothesis seem to be sensitive to the question of how one defines busy directors.
We extend previous papers by combining two strands of research: studies on busy boards (Ferris et al. 2003, Fich and Sivdasani 2006) and the literature on the relationship between social networks and corporate governance (Subrahmanyam 2008, Barnea and Guedj 2008) .
First and most importantly, we argue that the concept of "busyness" in itself has more than one dimension. Even though previous studies use slightly different definitions of busy boards, the authors generally apply a very similar procedure, which is to count the number of board seats that a director holds and classify boards as busy/not busy based on a predisposed threshold. However, this methodology misses an important aspect: how important are these other duties, and how time-consuming? Holding several positions in small companies is arguably very different from being a central player in a network of directors of the largest public firms. We use several alternative definitions influenced by the literature on social network analysis and show in a multivariate panel framework that firms with board members who are central players in the social network exhibit weaker firm governance. Second, previous papers in this area are limited to the US, where (inside) firm governance is based on the one-tier system. The literature therefore focuses on outside directors under the premise that inside directors do not monitor management (Fich and Shivdasani 2006) . However, in the one-tier setting management might have a preference to appoint directors from the same social circle to the board (Barnea and Guedj 2008, Mace 1986) . As a consequence, network measures do not only capture how well connected an outside (i.e. monitoring) director is, but also how connected management is. This complicates the interpretation of a relationship between network variables and firm governance since members of the board might just be more "lenient" towards management because they reciprocate or position themselves for other board seats (Wade et al. 1990) , and not because they are overcommitted. We use data from Germany, a country where governance structures are based on the two-tier system with an independent supervisory board. Most importantly, German law explicitly forbids executives from nominating candidates for the supervisory board. This legal environment allows us to examine the effect of a director's 1 position in the social network on firm governance independent from his/her interaction with executives.
Unlike the finance literature, where the topic of social networks has only recently gained importance, sociologists have applied mathematical concepts in assessing network structures for many years (see Scott (2000) for an overview). These methods facilitate the assessment of interpersonal relationships and their application to financial data. Barnea and Guedj (2008) generate measures that account for a director's importance in the social network and find that in firms with more connected directors, CEO remuneration is higher, and CEO turnover is less sensitive to firm performance. Subrahmanyam (2008) develops a model that links the optimal number of board memberships to social costs and benefits.
Belonging to a social group and interacting with others is among the most fundamental human needs (Maslow 1968, Baumeister and Leary 1995) . As individuals tend to form interpersonal connections with others who have a similar social status or background (McPherson et al. 2001 , Munshi 2003 , board members might establish a social network that builds heavily on their connection with other directors. Useem (1984) characterizes directors of large corporations as members of an 'inner circle' of organizational elites who are accountable only to themselves. Taken together with the fact that members of a supervisory board are usually wealthy individuals, managers of other corporations or even former executives of the samefirm, their social needs might have an influence on how they treat managers (who also belong to the 'inner circle'). Based on the idea that socially connected individuals tend to take care of each other, a more connected board might present a barrier to effective corporate governance. In addition, it is time-consuming to establish and maintain social ties. Mayhew and Levinger (1976) argue that the time that can be allocated to any relation is limited and that the number of contacts an agent can sustain will decline as the size of the network increases. On the other hand, this argument implies that individuals who are important players in the network will have less time for other obligations since other members will use their central position in the network as a communication channel. Taken together, this leads us to hypothesize that directors who are central players in the network of organizational elites might be overcommitted and therefore contribute less time and effort to monitor management.
In this sense, it is not only the number of board appointments that causes a director to be "too busy" or overcommitted, but also the quality of these positions.
We examine this hypothesis by mapping the entire social network of all members of the supervisory boards of the largest 133 German publicly traded firms from 2003 to 2006. In doing so, we map all connections between directors who have -at one point in time -been members of a board in our sample (independently for every year). This means that the data that is used to compute our social network measures is not restricted to the 133 sample firms.
A good example is "FC Bayern München AG", through which four directors in our sample are connected, even though the company itself is not part of the sample. This leads to a total of roughly 1,600 directors and about 35,000 connections in our dataset (per year). We then aggregate this data on a firm-level and compute several measures that identify whether a board might be overcommitted.
Using fixed-effects panel regressions we find that firms with better connected supervisory boards show significantly lower values of Tobin's q. In addition, the average remuneration of executives in firms with better connected directors is significantly higher. These results are robust to the use of alternative network measures. In both cases, simple measures for busy directors that were used by other researchers in the past fail to show any significant patterns.
We interpret our findings as evidence for weaker governance and poorer monitoring in firms with directors who play an important role in the social network. 2 Our results have important implications for the discussion of limiting the number of directorships: They indicate that merely putting a limit on the number of board appointments that directors are allowed to hold might not to prevent them from being overcommitted.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief outline of the literature related to busy directors. Section 3 focuses on the construction of the dataset 2 Again, it should be noted that directors do not have an incentive to be more lenient towards executives because they might wish to reciprocate for being appointed to the board (Wade et al. 1990 ). According to paragraph 124(3) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG), executives are not allowed to nominate members of the supervisory board. Monitoring the executive board it is the main responsibility of members of the supervisory board.
and our network measures and presents descriptive statistics. Section 4 contains the multivariate panel data analysis. Section 5 concludes.
II. Literature on Directorships
The literature on directors with multiple board appointments so far has mainly focused on the U.S., and therefore the one-tier board setting. In this environment, corporate boards consist of inside directors who run the firm, and outside directors who are not part of the management team of the company they govern. Fama and Jensen (1983) On the other hand, several studies suggest that too many board appointments might lower the effectiveness of outside directors as monitors (Shivdasani and Yermack 1999, Core et al. 1999 ). The busyness hypothesis, advanced by Ferris et al. (2002) posits that directors with multiple board appointments can become overcommitted and might be too busy to monitor management adequately. Core et al. (1999) find a positive correlation between the percentage of outside directors who serve on three or more boards and the level of executive compensation, suggesting that busy directors are less likely to engage in close managerial monitoring compared to directors who hold fewer board seats. In line with these results, Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) report that the likelihood of being appointed to a board is higher for busy directors if the CEO (who presumably does not like to be monitored) is involved in the selection of new board members.
Based on these arguments, it is not a priori obvious whether the possible disadvantages of serving on a large number of boards outweigh the advantages that arise from the reputation and experience of these directors. Ferris et al. (2003) examine the question of whether multiple board appointments by directors harm firm performance using a cross-section of U.S. firms in 1995. They fail to detect any evidence of the negative relation predicted by the busyness hypothesis and conclude that monitoring by busy boards is as effective as monitoring by non-busy boards. In contrast to these results, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that firms with busy directors have significantly lower market-to-book ratios. They argue that limitations in the research design used by Ferris et al. (2003) prevent them from detecting a significant relationship. Among other things, Ferris et al. (2003) use a single cross-section and do not control for the presence of omitted firm-specific variables, which leads to biased OLSestimates. In addition, the definition of busy boards used by Fich and Shivdasani (2006) differs from Ferris et al.'s (2003) definition. With respect to outside directors, Ferris et al. (2003) calculate the average number of sample firm directorships held by the directors of a firm. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) use several alternative definitions and focus exclusively on outside directors. They consider directors busy if they hold directorships in three or more firms and find that firms in which the majority of outside directors is busy have market-tobook ratios that are about 4.2% lower. In a closely related study, Jiraporn et al. (in press) examine the relationship between director busyness and board committee memberships. In support of the busyness hypothesis, they find that individuals who hold more outside directorships tend to serve on fewer board committees. However, this relation seems to be non-linear and negative only up to a certain point.
In sum, the empirical evidence concerning the question of whether sitting on numerous boards has a negative impact on the ability to perform monitoring tasks effectively is ambiguous. On a theoretical basis, the busyness hypothesis stands in contrast to the reputation hypothesis.
This alternative hypothesis suggests that multiple directorships can add value by allowing directors to establish a network that can be useful for the firm. Given these conflicting ideas, it is surprising that the pertinent empirical literature focuses exclusively on the number of board appointments held by a director. If possible advantages of multiple directorships are related to the idea of building networks, empirical tests should also take this dimension of additional board memberships into account.
In our paper, we follow this reasoning using different concepts from the literature on social network analysis.
III. Dataset and Network Measures
A. Sample Selection
The sample for this investigation is based on all companies that were part of the three largest 
B. Measurement of Multiple Directorships
According to paragraph 125 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) publicly traded firms have to disclose all directorships that members of their supervisory board hold in other (for-profit) firms. We therefore count all directorships in public and non-public firms. 6 This information also allows us to detect all connections between directors in our sample that lie beyond the 133 sample firms.
As stated above, the German corporate board system is two-tiered. In this system, members of the supervisory board oversee the actions of the executive board, i.e. management. Among other duties, members of the supervisory board appoint and dismiss executives, approve managements' decisions, and set their remuneration. 7 Depending on the number of staff, employees are allocated control rights through the supervisory board by several codetermination laws. These codetermination laws apply to both public and private companies as soon as they reach a minimum of 500 employees. Simply put, firms with more than 500 but less than 2,000 staff have to allocate one-third, firms with more than 2,000 staff one-half of the supervisory board seats to employee representatives. 8 Employee representatives are often union members (and in the case of large firms often high rank union officials), but in general the staff can elect any employee to the supervisory board. In theory, this implies that employees and shareholders run the company cooperatively, in particular in 5 The Hoppenstedt Aktienführer is a yearly publication that provides detailed information (e.g., ownership structure, balance sheet information) on German listed firms. 6 We exclude board appointments in non-profit organizations, trusts, and charitable organizations. 7 See the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) for a comprehensive description of the rights and duties of the supervisory board. 8 See Gorton and Schmid (2004) for a more detailed description of the system of codetermination and the legal background.
companies in which one-half of the supervisory board seats are allocated to employee representatives. However, in practice, the influence of employees is somewhat limited. In companies with one-half representation, shareholders' representatives can overrule employees with the help of the chairman's tie-breaking vote. In our sample, about 55% ( Table 1 we report data regarding the frequency of multiple board appointments for our sample.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
The median board in our sample consists of 13 directors, seven of which are shareholder representatives and six are employee representatives. On average, directors hold 3.49
(excluding employee representatives) and 2.72 (including employee representatives)
directorships. In line with Fich and Shivdasani (2006) we construct a dummy (0,1) variable that is set to one if 50% or more of the board's shareholder representatives are busy.
According to this measure, about 47% of the firms are governed by "busy boards". In contrast to Ferris et al. (2003) we do not find a positive correlation between multiple directorships and firm size.
C. Social Network Measures
Any social network consists of several agents who are connected with each other through social relations such as direct contacts, group attachments, or meetings (Scott, 2000) . The members of a network and their connections can be visualized as a structure of nodes and ties.
In our analysis, nodes are the individual directors within the network, and ties are the relationships between these directors. Two directors are connected if they serve on the same supervisory board. For each firm and each year in our sample, we collect data on all directors who serve on a firm's board. This leads to a database with about 1,600 nodes and roughly 35,000 ties. We then build an annual social matrix, in which each director is represented by a column and a row. Whenever two directors i and j serve on the same board, the value of the intersection point, i.e. cell (i,j) is 1, otherwise it is 0. Since relationships are always bilateral (director i knows director j, which implies that j must know i), this procedure results in a symmetric matrix, with the diagonal (the relation between i and i) being 0 by definition. [Insert Figure 1 about here]
The concept of "centrality" is used in social network research in order to determine the relative importance of a person within a network. We use three different well established measures that all rest on the notion that central agents in the network have better access to resources within the network (e.g. information). Therefore, centrality in the network can be regarded as an equivalent to importance and popularity.
The Degree centrality (C D ) is based on the number of direct links (or contacts) incident on a node (i.e. director). Under this definition, a central director assumes a structural (not necessarily important) position in the network and serves as source or distributor of information and resources. Even though this measure is very intuitive and comparatively easy to implement, its explanatory power is limited to the first level of the network. This means that two directors who have the same number of direct connections will get assigned the same value C D (n i ), irrespective of how well connected their contacts are. Theoretically, this measure should be closest to the variable "busy board" as it only captures the number of connections. Degree centrality is defined as follows:
where g is the total number of directors or nodes n i . The variable is further normalized by dividing (1) by the number of possible connections of director n i with the other g-1 nodes in the network:
The underlying idea of our second measure, Betweenness centrality (C B ), is that an agent who is situated on many geodesic paths 11 between any two nodes is a central and important player (Freeman 1979) . In other words, the concept of Betweenness measures the extent to which an agent can act as a "gatekeeper" and control the flow of information between two other agents.
In our context, a director with a comparatively high Betweenness centrality will most likely devote much of his time and attention to his network. As Mayhew and Levinger (1976) argue, maintaining social ties is generally time-consuming. It will most likely demand even more attention the more important the "gatekeeper" is. An agent in such a position can also demand a commission for his role as an intermediary (Scott 2000) . The commission will most likely come about in the form of non-pecuniary benefits (e.g. invitation to sports events, etc.) or other personal benefits. However, it is unlikely that the "gatekeeper" will share these benefits with the companies in which he acts as member of the supervisory board.
Mathematically, Betweenness centrality can be defined as follows, where p ik (n i ) is the number of geodesic paths between j and k that run through i:
Compared to Degree, the Betweenness measure is better capable of measuring the importance, and thus the commitment, of directors. The measure also has a drawback, since it will always be 0 if a director does not have any connections outside of "his" board. This holds true for about 70% of the directors if employee representatives are included.
The third measure, Connectiveness or Eigenvalue centrality (C C ), has been developed by Bonacich (1972 Bonacich ( , 1987 and uses weighted scores. Bonacich argues that the "quality" of connections should be taken into account when assessing the centrality of an agent. This means that the extent to which a director is connected to other well connected directors is captured by the Connectiveness measure. Whenever a director gets connected to another well connected agent, this will not only boost his own centrality, but also the centrality of other directors who are connected to him. Formally, the individual centrality of each director is computed as follows:
W ij stands for the intersection of row i and column j in the social matrix discussed above. Bonacich (1972) shows that there exists a positive Eigenvalue  for every Matrix W that results in a corresponding Eigenvector C C that only consists of positive values or 0. This condition is met for the largest positive Eigenvalue. Like Degree centrality, our variables
Betweenness and Connectiveness are normalized.
As stated above, the disclosure requirements of the German Stock Corporation Act ( §125 AktG) allow us to map the entire network of directors beyond our sample firms. Thus, it is captured in our database if two directors who serve on two different boards of our sample firms both hold a directorship in another (public or private) firm that is not part of our sample.
We construct social matrices for each year between 2003 and 2006 in order to document changes in the network. Whenever a director leaves the board, we assume that he knows his successor, i.e. that there is a connection between the two of them.
Our network measures are computed with the help of the UCINET software package v6.171.
Our choice is based on Huisman and van Duijn (2005) who compare different software packages used for social network analysis. In a last step, the data on individual directors is aggregated on a firm level. This allows us to draw conclusions concerning the extent to which members of the supervisory board -and thus the board as a whole -might be busy or overcommitted. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics (in percent) for our centrality measures.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
We also test for the correlation of the firm-level centrality measures with firm characteristics.
Notably, the highest correlation between a centrality measure and firm size amounts to only 0.42. 12 This implies that being on the board of a large firm does not necessarily mean that directors are well connected or that the board as a whole has a high centrality.
IV. Multivariate Analysis
Our main hypothesis rests on the assumption that individuals who are overcommitted might shirk their responsibilities as directors. In the previous literature, the "busyness" of a director has been derived based on the number of directorships. We argue that this might be too simplistic a measure since it does not capture the "quality" of these other obligations and propose an alternative approach based on measures from social network research.
In this section, we examine the effect of overcommitted boards on firm performance (measured by Tobin's q) and executive remuneration in a multivariate panel regression framework.
A. Multiple Directorships and Firm Performance
In a first step, we apply the methodology used by Ferris et al. (2003) and Fich and Shivdasani (2006) to our dataset. More specifically, we estimate firm fixed-effects models using marketto-book value as the dependent variable. 13 These models assume that agency costs (which arise due to poor monitoring by overcommitted directors) are reflected by a lower market-tobook ratio. The market-to-book ratio is used as a proxy for Tobin's q. It is calculated as market value of equity at the end of the year plus book value of debt divided by the book value of assets at the end of the year. As explanatory variables, we include the three alternative measures for "busy boards" used by Fich and Shivdasani (2006) and variables that control for corporate governance and financial characteristics. We control for firm size using the natural logarithm of total assets. According to the results of Yermack (1996) and Fich and Shivdasani (2006) board size has a negative and significant effect on firm performance. We therefore control for board size using the log of the number of directors. We also include control variables for the level of employee representation on the board. In a study of German codetermination, Gorton and Schmid (2004) find that market valuation decreases with the number of employee representatives on the supervisory board. In addition, several studies have shown that ownership characteristics play an important role in the German system of corporate governance (Franks and Mayer 2001, Andres 2008 ). In the absence of an active takeover market, large blockholders often act as the main monitors of a firm. We therefore include the free float (all outstanding shares minus shares held by blockholders > 5%) as a control variable. The regressions further contain controls for accounting performance (return on assets), firm age (natural logarithm of years since incorporation) and capital structure (leverage, defined as book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets). Lastly, all models include year and industry dummies.
The results of the multivariate panel regressions are reported in Table 4 . 14 In models (1)- (3) all variables that measure the extent to which boards are busy are based on directors that represent the interests of shareholders (i.e. excluding employee representatives). Regressions (4)-(6) are based on all directors, including employee representatives. We do not find signs of a significant relationship between busy directors and firm performance in any model specification. The coefficients for busy board (a dummy that is set to one if 50% or more of the directors hold three or more directorships) and percentage of busy directors (both used by 14 Tests for multicollinearity indicate that the correlation of the variables size and board size might be too high (0.67). We therefore estimate all regressions without board size as a robustness test. The results are not influenced by the correlation between the two variables. [Insert Table 4 about here]
B. Director Networks and Firm Governance
The preceding results do not support the hypothesis that busy boards are associated with poor firm performance. This view is based on the notion that too many board assignments might detract from the ability of directors to act as vigilant monitors of management; directors might become overcommitted and as a result they might not have the time and attention required for their monitoring duties. As discussed above, several research papers have tested the hypothesis that serving on multiple boards has a negative impact on corporate performance. In these studies, boards are classified as busy/not busy based on the number and percentage of directorships per director. However, these measures will be noisy if they do not adequately capture the extent to which directors are really busy and overcommitted. We first examine the effect of directors' importance in the social network on firm performance. Table 5 reports the results of fixed-effects regressions with Tobin's q as dependent variable. In models (1)- (3) we use the network measures as substitutes for the busy board variables included in section IV.A. Model specifications (4)- (6) (2002) show, both theoretically and empirically, that top-management compensation is influenced by the board's structure. In line with Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) , they find CEO compensation to be higher when the CEO is also chairman of the board. Lastly, Sapp (2008) shows that measures for weaker boards are related positively to the level of CEO compensation.
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1986) , the presence of a large shareholder leads to closer monitoring of the managements' performance. Bertant and Mullainathan (2001) find that in firms that lack a large external blockholder, CEO compensation is less dependent on managerial effort. They find that in better governed firms, CEOs are less likely to be rewarded for luck. Hartzell and Starks (2003) examine the relationship between ownership concentration and executive compensation and higher find pay-performance sensitivity and lower executive compensation the more concentrated institutional ownership is. Related to the literature on busy boards, Shivdasani (1993) among the explanatory variables. Even though most firms use some form of equity-based compensation as part of their executive compensation packages, pay-performance sensitivities are generally found to be low (e.g. Jensen and Murphy 1990 ). Nevertheless, we control for past operating (return on assets) and stock price performance (we use the CDAX performance 16 Until recently, German companies were not required to disclose executive remuneration on an individual basis. However, disclosure of the aggregate executive remuneration is mandated by the German Commercial Code. We combine the information on aggregate compensation with information on the number of executives to compute the average per-capita remuneration for all sample firms. From 2007 onwards, publicly listed firms are required by law to disclose executive compensation on an individual basis. 17 As in the preceding regressions, we use the median of the normalized network measures as a robustness test. The results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to those reported in the text. 18 We also run all regressions with executive compensation as dependent variable using the three measures for busy boards that are derived from the number of directorships per director (not reported). The coefficients on these measures are negative, but insignificant in all regressions.
index to adjust stock returns over the past 12 months). Capital structure (leverage) is also included as a control variable (John and John 1993) . Lastly, we include dummy variables to control for year and industry fixed effects.
The results of fixed-effects panel regressions with executive compensation as dependent variable are presented in Table 6 . [Insert Table 6 about here]
In sum, the results of the regression analysis provide evidence that high levels of director centrality are associated with low firm performance and high levels of executive compensation. The results further indicate that social network measures yield explanatory power beyond simple measures of director busyness. We interpret our findings as evidence for weaker governance and poorer monitoring in firms with directors who are central players in the social network.
C. Robustness Tests
To be implemented!
V. Conclusion
Following a number of corporate scandals, governance structures have recently become a subject of public debate in many countries. Shareholder activists and organizations that defend the interests of minority shareholders often criticize firms for appointing directors who hold several directorships in other firms. This view is based on the argument that serving on too many boards will place a heavy burden on directors. As a result, directors might become overcommitted and shirk their responsibility as monitors of management. Corporate governance policy advocates have therefore called for limits on the number of directorships that a director should hold.
The debate has also spurred empirical research that investigates whether busy directors are indeed associated with poor governance. So far, empirical evidence is scarce and limited to the US. Most importantly, previous papers only look at the number of directorships in order to classify directors as (not) busy. In this manner, the metric used fails to grasp the importance and quality of additional board seats. We propose an alternative approach based on measures from the social network literature. By measuring the centrality of directors, it is possible to assign weights to different board seats based on the centrality in the corporate network.
We examine a sample of 133 German firms over four years, leading to a network of about 1,600 directors and 35,000 connections. Aggregated on a firm level, we use this data to investigate the relationship between firm governance and the directors' importance in the network. Our results show that well connected boards are associated with lower firm performance (as measured by Tobin's q). In addition, firms with better connected directors 23 pay their executives significantly more. We interpret these findings as evidence for poor monitoring in firms that have important and well connected directors.
These findings have direct policy implications. They suggest that calls for a limit of directorships are ill-advised as long as a limitation does not take into account the quality of these obligations. Our results also imply that it might not be optimal for shareholders to base their decision to vote for a particular director solely on his/her reputation, since the most reputable directors will most likely be those who are already present on several boards and therefore have to balance the interests of many parties. Having a large number of important directors on the board can thus be counterproductive as it might lead to an overcommitted board.
Figure 1 Network of all directors
This graphic shows connections between all directors of 133 German firms for the year 2003. The total number of directors is 1,654, the number of connections is 35,106. (1)-(3) these variables are computed based on shareholder representatives only, the board variables in models (4)-(6) are based on all directors (including employee representatives). One-third (one-half) representation is a dummy that is set to one if 33% (50%) of the supervisory board members are employee representatives. Leverage is defined as book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets. Free float is calculated as the fraction of voting equity that is not held by large shareholders. Large shareholders are shareholders who hold more than 5% of the voting equity. All regressions include year and industry dummies. T-Statistics (in parentheses) are WhiteHeteroskedasticity robust. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.10(*)-level.
Excluding employee representatives
All directors centrality of a firm's directors in the social network. Busy board is an indicator variable that is set to one if 50% (or more) of a firm's directors hold three (or more directorships). One-third (one-half) representation is a dummy that is set to one if 33% (50%) of the supervisory board members are employee representatives. Leverage is defined as book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets. Free float is calculated as the fraction of voting equity that is not held by large shareholders. Large shareholders are shareholders who hold more than 5% of the voting equity. All regressions include year and industry dummies. TStatistics (in parentheses) are White-Heteroskedasticity robust. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.10(*)-level.
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) centrality of a firm's directors in the social network. Busy board is an indicator variable that is set to one if 50% (or more) of a firm's directors hold three (or more directorships). Onethird (one-half) representation is a dummy that is set to one if 33% (50%) of the supervisory board members are employee representatives. Leverage is defined as book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets. Free float is calculated as the fraction of voting equity that is not held by large shareholders. Large shareholders are shareholders who hold more than 5% of the voting equity. All regressions include year and industry dummies. T-Statistics (in parentheses) are White-Heteroskedasticity robust. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.10(*)-level.
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